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Unilateral Economic Sanctions and Protecting 






 Terrorism remains the most important national security concern. 
Multi-national economic organizations around the world have increasingly 
established counter-terrorism commissions to assess the magnitude of the 
threat posed by terrorism. Economic sanctions have been a counter-terrorism 
measure for many decades and remain an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy 
and a mechanism to protect the U.S. national security interests.1 In recent 
years, the internationalization of terrorism and emergence of non-state ter-
rorist actors has led the U.S. to use smart targeted sanctions to dismantle 
financial support of terrorism. Yet, conventional country-specific nation-
wide sanctions that penalize a single target nation, continue to be used de-
spite their limited success.2 
 Nation-wide sanctions operate on the theory that by depressing the 
economy of the target country, and to a certain extent its leadership, the tar-
get county will have no choice but to comply with the policy objective of the 
sanction imposing country. However, there is growing evidence of an in-
verse relationship between the length of the sanctions and their effective-
ness.3 Moreover, justifications for the use of nation-wide sanctions to punish 
countries supporting terrorism has become obsolete. Today, we are witness-
ing the internationalization of terrorism and emergence of non-state adver-
saries. Hence, imposing nation-wide sanctions that are overreaching and 
 
 * Visiting Research Fellow at Fordham Law School; LL.M in Banking, Corporate and 
Financial law, Fordham Law School; LL.M in International Commercial Law, Pennsylvania 
State University; Master of Laws in Criminal law and Criminology, Shahid Beheshti Univer-
sity, Tehran, Iran; B.A in Law from Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran; Attorney at 
Law, Central Bar Association, Tehran, Iran. 
 1. Mergen Doraev, The “Memory Effect” of Economic Sanctions Against Russia: Op-
posing Approaches to the Legality of Unilateral Sanctions Clash Again, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
355, 381 (2015). 
 2. Maarten Smeets, Can Economic Sanctions Be Effective? 4, (WTO Economic Re-
search and Statistics Division, Geneva, Working Paper No. ERSD-2018-03, 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.30875/0b967ac6-en. 
 3. Id. at 12.  
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punish society as whole is inconsistent with today’s realities.  Furthermore, 
the negative effects of nation-wide sanctions on the socioeconomic condi-
tions of the target country help establish a setting for dissatisfaction amongst 
the citizens of the target country and hostility towards the sanction imposing 
country that encourages ideological extremism and terrorism.4  For this rea-
son, nation-wide sanctions should only used as a short-term measure, not as 
a permanent solution to terrorism. For economic sanctions to function as a 
successful counter-terrorism policy, they must use a combination of smart 




 4. Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror With-
out the War, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 587, 602-3 (2004).  
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I. Introduction 
 
Terrorism has become one of the most critical national security issues 
in recent years.  The threat of terrorism could disrupt the current balance of 
power, generate significant global instability, and lead to increased vio-
lence.5 The threat of terrorism can be ascertained by looking at the growing 
number of counter-terrorism commissions and official initiatives—many of 
them established by economic multi-national organizations. For example, 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) introduced its Counter Ter-
rorism Task Force (CTTF) in February 2003, which oversees the Secure 
Trade in the APEC Region (STAR)6 among its other activities.7 In 2002, The 
European Union (EU) adopted the Treaty on European Union, which con-
tains Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.8  
After the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 the EU launched a 
pan-European antiterrorism program that created a single database for arrest 
warrants to monitor and mitigate possible terrorist threats.9 In Southeast 
Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) initialed the 
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in November 2001.10 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the main counter-terrorism pol-
icy has focused on attacking the financing of terrorism and today remains the 
immediate responses to terrorism. In June 2002, the member nations of the 
regionally based Organization of American States (OAS) signed the Inter-
 
 5. Hale E. Sheppard, Revamping the Export-Import Bank In 2002: The Impact of This 
Interim Solution on the United States and Latin America, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. Pol’y 89, 
122 (2002-2003). 
 6. Secure Trade in the APEC Region, THE WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, https://georgew-
bush whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/internationaltrade/apec_star.html (last visited Mar. 18, 
2020). See also Bruce Bennett, APEC’s Response to Terrorism, UNISCI Discussion Papers, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/internationaltrade/apec_star.html (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2020).  
 7. Counter-Terrorism, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, 
https://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-
Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
 8. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, 1997, O.J. (C 
340/1), art. K.1 at 16-17. The Treaty of Amsterdam amended Article 29 of the Treaty of Eu-
ropean Union [Maastricht Treaty]. See Treaty of Maastricht 1992, O.J. (C 191/1).   
 9. Thomas Fuller, European Union Agrees on Plan to Coordinate Antiterror Effort, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/26/world/european-union-
agrees-on-plan-to-coordinate-antiterror-effort.html. 
 10. ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN), ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terror-
ism (2001), https://asean.org/?static_post=2001-asean-declaration-on-joint-action-to-coun-
ter-terrorism (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
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American Convention Against Terrorism.11 Following the September 11 at-
tacks on the U.S., the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1373 to condemn the attacks and set up the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, applicable to all members of the Security Council.12 Through 
their Financial Action Task Force, the G7 nations adopted a number of rec-
ommendations against terrorist financing.13 Moreover, the U.S. has used fi-
nancial measures against its adversaries for a long time.14 After the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act  which extended the 
authority of the President.15 The Act enabled President George W. Bush to 
issue sweeping economic sanctions as a  counterterrorism strategy.16 Since 
the attacks, the U.S. has since taken more serious steps to tackle the financing 
of terrorism.17 Consequently, the U.S. has used economic sanctions to ban 
North Korea, Syria, and Iran from entering the global financial system and 
has established serious financial measures to prevent terrorist organizations 
such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from accessing 
funds.18   
The connection between terrorism and globalization has helped world 
leaders establish broad security and economic policies. The Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that fights against money 
laundering and terrorist financing, and provides information sharing tech-
niques between countries on terrorist financing policing.19  While the attempt 
to identify and disrupt sources of terrorist funding remains at the center of 
many antiterrorism policies today, the approach is not new. For decades, 
countries have been using trade and economic sanctions against governments 
accused of sponsoring terrorism.20   
 
 11. Inter-Amer. Convention Against Terrorism, OAS General Assembly Resolution 
AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-0/02) 2nd plenary session, 3 June 2002, available at 
http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/agres1840_02.htm.  
 12. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1373]. 
 13. See FATF Recommendations 2012 (amended October 2020), FINANCIAL ACTION 
TASK FORCE, available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/docu-
ments/fatf-recommendations.html.  
 14. See Juan C. Zarate, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL 
WARFARE ix (2013). 
 15. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [here-
inafter Patriot Act]. 
 16. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Zarate, supra note 14, at x. 
 19. FATF Recommendations 2012, supra note 13, at 7. 
 20. See generally Loretta Napoleoni, MODERN JIHAD: TRACING THE DOLLARS BEHIND THE 
TERROR NETWORKS, 22 (2003). 
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Before discussing why nation-wide sanctions are ineffective in achiev-
ing national security objectives, it is important to understand the legal con-
text and history of U.S unilateral economic sanctions. The first part of this 
paper discusses the regulations of trade sanctions in today’s war against in-
ternational terrorism and explains the most important legislation regarding 
U.S. unilateral economic nation-wide sanctions, including their application 
and regulatory changes over the time. The second part examines the systemic 
inadequacy conventional nation-wide sanctions to fight against contempo-
rary forms of terrorism. First, it will discuss the inverse relationship between 
the length of sanctions and their efficacy by providing some examples of 
U.S. unilateral economic sanctions, country-based or activity-based, and 
their effectiveness in achieve their desired objectives. As addresses below, 
due to the internationalization of terrorism, there is no national identity for 
terrorists today and the traditional justifications for the use of nation-wide 
sanctions to punish nation-states for supporting terrorism has become out-
dated.21 Second, I will discuss the adverse effects of unilateral economic na-
tion-wide sanctions on the target state’s socioeconomic conditions which 
consequently lead to dissatisfaction and encourages extremist ideologies. Fi-
nally, I address how smart sanctions and antipoverty initiatives can act as a 
preventive policy to combat terrorism and protect the national security.  
 
II. Conventional Nation-Wide Sanctions 
 
Nation-wide sanctions are a conventional form of unilateral economic 
sanctions intended to penalize a nation  as a whole for violations by its gov-
ernment.22 Until recently, the fight against terrorism focused on stopping ter-
rorism funding by penalizing government sponsored terrorism, typically by 
punishing whole nations through limited trade and foreign investment.23 The 
connection between terrorism and the globalization of economies has led 
world powers to establish global, political, and economic policies focused 
on combatting terrorism.24 The policy of using trade as a counter-terrorism 
measure is based on the theory that the sanction-implementing country will 
weaken the income and welfare of the target country to an extremely low 
level.25 As the target country suffers depreciation in its economy, it will  
 
 21. Eric J. Lobsinger, Diminishing Borders in Trade and Terrorism: An Examination of 
Regional Applicability of GATT Article XXI National Security Trade Sanctions, 13 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 101 (2006) (discussing traditional justifications for sanctions). 
 22. Id. at 111. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 109. 
 25. Smeets, supra note 2. As indicated by the author a limitation of trade through the 
protection of individual markets by increasing tariffs or applying direct import restrictions 
will reduce the general welfare. Hence “[a]n embargo will create a supply shock and a boycott 
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eventually have little choice but to acquiesce to the objectives of the imple-
menting country.26  
The U.S. is the most active player in this arena, making it difficult to 
imagine U.S. foreign policy without its impositions of nation-wide sanc-
tions.27 Sanctions became an important part of the U.S. foreign policy during 
the Napoleonic wars in Europe. 28 In the 19th century, the U.S. limited the 
use of economic sanction to times of serious emergency situations.29 By the 
turn of the century, technological developments made sanctions methods 
such as blockades and other economic limitations obsolete.30 Nation-wide 
sanctions have become a common practice  in international conflicts between 
governments to settle international disputes instead of resorting to military 
action.31 During the World War I and II, the U.S. and the U.K. began imple-
menting sanctions against neutral states and individuals who traded with the 
enemy.32 After World War II, the U.S. developed a more extensive legal and 
regulatory system of sanctions and export controls, which have since became 
an economic warfare instrument.33  
Therefore, economic sanctions have long been used to cut off funding 
to foreign adversaries. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the 
U.S., the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1373  which 
applied to all members and required compliance with its International Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.34 Hence , the U.S. 
as the financial world superpower made specific efforts to cut off funding 
for terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS35 and has invested consid-
erable resources in improving its financial capabilities in the fight against 
terrorism. The Treasury Department’s intelligence and counter-terrorism 
 
will isolate the target country from the world market. A net welfare loss will be the result. 
Depending on the relative balance of powers between the countries involved and the im-
portance of their economic interaction (large versus small country), the imposing party can 
explicitly depress the income and welfare level of the target country to an unacceptably low 
level. The weaker party will face deteriorating terms of trade and it is expected that it will be 
forced to comply,” id. at 5. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 4 (2001) (discussing United States’ sanction activity). 
 28. Sarabeth Egle, The Learning Curve of Sanctions - Have Three Decades of Sanctions 
Reform Taught Us Anything?, 19 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 34, 38 (2011) (discussing 
United States’ stance on unilateral sanctions). 
 29. See generally Kern Alexander, International Political Economy and Economic Sanc-
tions, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 30-54 (2009). 
 30. Egle, supra note 28, at 38. 
 31. See Lobsinger, supra note 21, at 111. 
 32. Egle, supra note 28, at 38. 
 33. Id. 
 34. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 12. 
 35. Zarate, supra note 14, at v-ix.  
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units now consist of more than 700 individuals with an annual budget of 
$200 million to battle increasing numbers of adversaries using various finan-
cial weapons of war.36 The most important relevant U.S legislations are the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)37 and the Export 
Administration Act (EEA).38 These regulations grant wide powers to the 
President of the U.S. to impose sanctions against hostile nations.39 The EEA 
has been imposed against South Africa, Iraq, Haiti, Burma, Sudan, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.40 
Although the primary goal of imposing economic sanctions is to sup-
press a threat to international peace and security,41 the U.S. has previously 
used sanctions against nations for different reasons including promoting hu-
man rights, urging a regime change, and fighting against narcotics trafficking 
and terrorism.42 Arguably, if sanctions are imposed due to human rights con-
cerns, severe violations can be seen as a danger of worldwide peace and se-
curity.43  
 
III. Legislative Bases of U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions  
Regulations 
 
Economic sanctions remain an essential element of U.S. foreign policy 
and a mechanism to address international security challenges.44  In 2011, for-
mer Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explicated: “We are committed to rais-
ing the economic cost of unacceptable behavior [of states that threaten global 
security or its own people] and denying the resources that make it possi-
ble.”45 The U.S. also uses economic sanctions as unilateral self-help counter 
measures.46 Unilateral economic sanction is defined as 
 
 36. Tom C.W. Lin, Financial Weapons of War, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1405 (2016)  
(citing Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Enforcer at Treasury is First Line of Attack Against ISIS, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2014).  
37 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2004). 
38 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2004). 
 39. Lobsinger, supra note 21, at 110.  
 40. Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of 
Compatibility, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 133, 143-44 (2002). 
41 Cleveland, supra note 27, at 39. 
 42. Sarah P. Schuette, U.S. Economic Sanctions Regarding the Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons: A Call for Reform of the Arms Export Control Act Sanctions, 35 CORNELL INT. L. 
J. 231, 234-35 (2001). 
 43. Hoe Lim, Trade and Human Rights: What’s at Issue? 35 (Apr. 10, 2001) (un-
published working paper) (SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1682245). 
 44. Doraev, supra note 1, 381. 
 45. See Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Economic Statecraft, 
Speech at Economic Club of New York (Oct. 14, 2011), available at https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175552.htm. 
 46. Alexander, supra note 29, at 58. 
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“any unilateral restriction or condition on economic activity with respect to 
a foreign country or foreign entity that is imposed by the United States for 
reasons of foreign policy or national security.”47  
The U.S. believes that foreign trade is a matter of national sovereignty 
and there are no restrictions on the state’s sovereign right to regulate its trade 
relations with other nations under international law.48 Currently, the U.S. is 
indirectly enforcing several sanctions against various countries and regions 
independently of the U.N. Security Council.49 There are several statutory 
regulations, some of which reflect congressional concerns defining which 
sanctions are applied, and others that are more general and authorize execu-
tive actions.50 
There are two types of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions—country-
specific and activity-based.51 Country-specific sanctions fall into two cate-
gories, comprehensive and entity-based. Comprehensive sanctions restrict 
the activities of U.S. persons with nationalities of the target country. Entity-
based sanctions restrict the activities of U.S persons with designated nation-
als who engage in the activities subject to sanctions. Entity-based sanctions 
are also known as list-based sanctions based on Specially Designated Na-
tionals (SDNs) lists.52 
 
A. Country-Specific Sanctions 
 
Country-specific sanctions are the most common form of U.S. sanc-
tions.53 The list of countries subject to U.S economic sanctions is adjusted 
regularly as the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC)54 adds or repeals regulations based on the target country and its re-
lations with the U.S.55 
 
 47. Overview and Analysis of Current U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions, No. 332-
391, USITC Pub. 3124 (Aug, 1988).  
 48. Doraev, supra note 1, at 381. 
 49. See generally Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
Sanctions Programs and Country Information, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx. 
 50. 17.04 General Operation of U.S Sanctions, 17 U.S. Economic Sanctions¸ in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Mark K. Neville ed. 2020) (WL 
5356750) [hereinafter U.S. Economic Sanctions]. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (Mar. 31, 2021), available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationals-
and-blocked-persons-list-sdn-human-readable-lists.  
 55. U.S. Economic Sanctions, supra note 50.  
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Unless the U.S. government grants a license permitting otherwise, com-
prehensive country-based sanctions limit most economic interactions with 
those specified countries. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from partic-
ipating or facilitating, directly or indirectly, any transaction involving a sanc-
tioned country, government, or agent of that government.56 There may also 
be prohibitions on dealings with any national of the sanctioned country.57 
Under these sanctions, shipments of goods, providing services, or other deal-
ings with sanctioned countries or with restricted individuals in those coun-
tries cannot take place without a license.58 Assets of sanctioned organiza-
tions that are under the control of U.S. persons must be held in blocked bank 
accounts to prevent owners from accessing them.59 The sanctions also pro-
hibit other transactions, such as imports, exports, contracts, financial trans-
actions, and other economic relations with the sanctioned country, govern-
ment, and nationals.60 
Under the entity-based or list-based sanctions program, the Treasury 
Department designates individuals, entities, banks, vessels, and organiza-
tions that are owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of sanctions targets (i.e., 
targeted governments) and places them on the SDN list.61 Accordingly, U.S. 
persons are prohibited from doing business, directly or indirectly, with such 
designated entities.62  
 
B. Activity-Based Sanctions 
 
Activity-based sanctions are intended restrict to certain illegal activities 
such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction.63 Unlike country-specific sanctions, activity-based sanctions do 
not seek to target a specific country but instead target designated persons or 
organizations, regardless of their country of residence. An exception to ac-
tivity-based sanctions involve certain governments that are considered to 
promote the restricted activities, such as government sponsored terrorism.64 
The primary mechanism for enforcing activity-based sanctions is identifica-
tion of individuals and organizations engaged  in the restricted activities and 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Alan F. Enslen et. al., Balancing Free Trade with International Security: What Every 
Alabama Attorney Should Know about International Trade Controls, 74 Ala Law. 97, 100 
(2013). 
 62. Id. 
 63. U.S. Economic Sanctions, supra note 50.  
 64. Id. 
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the prohibition of any financial transaction with them.65 Hence, these kind of 
sanctions, known as “smart sanctions,” may be directed at specific foreign 
officials or governmental functions without having a direct adverse impact 
on the economy of the foreign nation state as a whole and its people.66 This 
is in stark contrast to conventional nation-wide sanctions which impact the 
economy of whole  nation and its population rather than the specific entities 
that sponsor or support terrorism.67 
Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration intro-
duced new legislation extending U.S. counter-terrorism sanctions pol-
icy against individuals and organizations on the list of specially designated 
terrorist (SDTs) and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).68 Moreover, in 
order to develop broad international cooperation in the War on Terror, the 
U.S. stated its readiness to lift sanctions against previously targeted states.69 
OFAC, as the financial intelligence and enforcement agency within the De-
partment of the Treasury, is responsible for administering and regulating 
economic  sanctions against targeted adverse countries for the purpose of 
advancing U.S. national security and foreign policy.70 The authority of 
OFAC to enforce sanctions is primarily set out in ten statutes: 
 
1. TWEA (The Trading with the Enemy Act)71 addresses political con-
cerns and was the basis for Cuban and, formerly, North Korean sanc-
tions. The TWEA is seldom used today because of a congressional 
joint resolution in October 1951, which restricted TWEA’s applica-
bility to only periods of war or national emergencies. The Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) expanded this re-
striction by excluding the applicability of TWEA from national 
emergencies.72 
 
2. IEEPA (The International Emergency Economic Powers Act)73 was 
enacted in 1977 and is the legislative basis for sanctions against 
Burma, Iran, Sudan, and Zimbabwe as well as sanctions against the 
diamond trade, terrorism, narcotics, and nonproliferation 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Doraev, supra note 1, at 385. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 386. 
 69. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND 
CURRENT POLICY, 171-172 (3d ed. 2009). 
 70. See John Crabb, OFAC Designation of Russian Bank a Warning to Maduro’s Sup-
porters, INTR’L FINANCIAL L. REV. N. Page (2013).   
 71. 50 U.S.C. § 4301. 
 72. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07.  
 73. Id.  
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sanctions.74 After preparing a report for Congress on circumstances 
constituting an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” the President can 
use IEEPA to recommend the necessary measures to deal with the 
situation.75 Following the September 11 attacks, Congress enacted 
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the 
USA Patriot Act),76 which expanded the powers of the President and 
his designees by granting the President the authority to block trans-
actions involving properties within the jurisdiction of the U.S. dur-
ing the investigation.77 
 
3. ISA (The Iraqi Sanctions Act)78 is the basis for the former Iraqi sanc-
tions in response to the Iraq attacks on Kuwait. It has largely been 
replaced by the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, generally issued under 
the authority of IEEPA.79 
 
4. UNPA (The United Nations Participation Act)80 is the basis for the 
sanctions against Iraq and the diamond Trade81. The Act grants to 
the President the authority to implement mandatory provisions 
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and authorizes the 
President to align U.S. foreign policy with UN Security Council res-
olutions, including civil and criminal sanctions.82 Under this Act, 
any funds or properties involved in any violation of the President’s 
regulations under will be forfeited to the U.S.83 
 
 
 74. Id. at § 1701(a) (“Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title 
may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in 
whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to 
such threat.”).  
 75. Id.  
 76. Patriot Act, supra note 15, at 115.  
 77. Id. 
 78. See 17.03 Statutory Bases For Sanctions Regulations¸ in INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Mark K. Neville Jr. ed. 2020) (WL 5356752) [hereinafter Stat-
utory Bases].  
 79. Id.  
 80. 22 U.S.C. § 287c.  
 81. Exec. Order No. 13312, Fed. Reg. 45151 (July 29, 2003).  
 82. See 22 U.S.C. § 287c.  
 83. § 546.701 Penalties., 31 C.F.R. § 546.701. 
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5. ISDCA (The International Security and Development Cooperation 
Act)84 was the basis of certain sanctions imposed on Iran. The Act 
also provides a ban on the import of goods and services from any 
country that supports terrorism. While Iran was the target of this Act, 
it can be extended to trade with any country that supports terrorism.85 
 
6. CDA (The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992) was partially the other 
basis for Cuban sanctions. 86 The Act states that blocked funds could 
not be used to exports goods to Cuba.87 The Act also  decreased 
Cuba’s restrictions on receiving food and humanitarian donations by 
allowing non-governmental organizations and individuals in Cuba 
to assist without requiring a particular license.88 Exports of medi-
cines and medical supplies from the U.S. to Cuba are also permitted, 
but such exports must be authorized through licenses from Bureau 
of Industry and Security (BIS).89  
7. LIBERTAD (The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act)90 
remains a partial basis for Cuban sanctions. The Act is also known 
as the Helms-Burton Act, which codifies the Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations and imposes some extraterritorial limits on the activities 
of foreign persons.91 The Act was used to refuse visas to foreign ex-
ecutives entering the U.S.92 
8. AEDPA (The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act)93 was 
enacted in 1996 and is the basis for sanctions against Cuba, Iran, 
Iraq, Sudan, and Syria. It discusses circumstances in which U.S. cit-
izens’ who support or participate in financial transactions with gov-
ernments of the stated countries can be perceived as supporting in-
ternational terrorism. 
 
 84. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99 -
 83. (99 Stat. 190). Now codified in 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9.  
 85. Statutory Bases, supra note 78. 
 86. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484 (106 Stat. 2575). Remaining 
provisions codified in 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010. 
 87. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 88. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, supra note 86.  
 89. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 90. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114 (110 
Stat. 785). Remaining provisions codified in 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091,  
 91. Id.  
 92. 22 U.S.C. § 6091.  
 93. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (110 
Stat. 1214). Remaining provisions codified in 18 U.S.C §§2339B & § 2332d. 
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9. Kingpin Act (The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act)94 is 
the basis for restrictions against narcotics trafficking.  The purpose 
of the Act is to deny significant foreign narcotic traffickers, their 
organizations, and agents access to the U.S. financial system and 
prohibit all trade and transactions between U.S. corporations and in-
dividuals.95 It also seeks to block the property in which designated 
narcotic dealers and specially designated narcotic traffickers are in-
volved.96 
10. CISADA (The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010)97 is the basis of the Iranian Transactions 
and Sanctions Regulations, the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regula-
tions, and the Iranian Human Rights Abuses Sanctions Regula-
tions.98 CISADA amended the provisions of the previous Iran Sanc-
tions Act to: (1) broaden U.S. sanctions against third-country 
entities; (2) allow additional sanctions to be imposed on Iran; (3) 
codify existing sanctions against Iran; and (4) establish new due dil-
igence obligations for financial institutions.99 It also amended the 
Iran Sanctions Act by Requiring the President to initiate an investi-
gation into imposing possible sanctions on person who contribute to 
Iran’s supply of refined petroleum, increase the possible sanctions 
the U.S. government can impose, and extending coverage of the 
sanctions to any persons or entity worldwide. 100 Coverage can ex-
tend to parent companies of subsidiaries who knew or should have 
known of the sanctionable activity.101 
These ten laws cover the entire legal structure of OFAC enforcement 
actions, but they are not the only applicable authorities. By passing new laws, 
Congress frequently imposes new sanctions or modifies existing ones. 
IEEPA is the basis for most of the current sanctions imposed today be-
cause it is based on a declaration by the President of a “national emergency” 
 
 94. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120 (113 
Stat. 1606). Codified in 21 U.S.C. §1902-1908 (Westlaw through 116-259). 
 95. Press Release, THE WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet: Overview of the Foreign Narcotics 
Kingpin Designation Act (Apr. 15, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/fact-sheet-overview-foreign-narcotics-kingpin-designation-act.  
 96. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 97. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-195 (124 Stat. 1312). Codified in 22 U.S.C §§ 8501 -8551.  
 98. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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situation.102 Upon the declaration of “national emergency,” IEEPA author-
ized the president to take the following actions:103  
 
[I]nvestigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, reg-
ulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any ac-
quisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, trans-
portation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or 
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or trans-
actions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a 
national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to 
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . . 
.104  
 
IEEPA permits the confiscation of any property of a foreign individual 
who has “planned, authorized, aided, or engaged” in hostilities against the 
U.S.105 
Sanctions and export controls are the top priorities of the U.S. govern-
ment.106 The Department of Justice (DOJ) launched a comprehensive Na-
tional Counter-Proliferation Initiative on October 11, 2007, which includes 
coordination between the DOJ and special agents of the BIS Office for Ex-
port Enforcement, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
to target export controls and sanctions violations.107 The sharp focus on en-
forcement increases the risks to businesses and companies potentially im-
pacted by the regulations.108 Risks are increased because the sanctions’ reg-
ulations bring the compilation of international transactions under scrutiny.109 
Contracts, financial transactions, letters of credit, and intellectual property 
rights registered in sanctioned countries, and insurance, liens on property, 
travel, and transactions with subsidiaries dealing with the sanctioned country 
are all subject to restrictions.110 The scope of the sanctions and the vast 
 
 102. Christopher A. Casey et al., CONG. RES. SERV., R45618, The International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use 5 (2020), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf.  
 103. 50 U.S.C. § 1701.  
 104. Id. § 1702.  
 105. Id; see also Exec. Order No. 13290, 69 Fed. Reg. 46055 (Mar. 24, 2003). 
 106. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 107. Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Justice Department and Partner Agencies Launch 
National Counter-Proliferation Initiative (Oct. 11, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/ar-
chive/opa/pr/2007/October/07_nsd_806.html. 
 108. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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shadow of the OFAC over foreign transactions make it important to under-
stand the essence of sanctions and to know how to enter into safe transac-
tions.111 
 
IV. National Security Challenges to the U.S. Unilateral Economic 
Sanctions 
 
Broad sanctions that gives extensive discretion to the President to im-
plement may result in criminal convictions, as permitted under TWEA and 
IEEPA, have been challenged in courts on constitutional grounds—however, 
such cases rarely succeed.112 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Regan v. 
Wald, these are matters “so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of 
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”113 
IEEPA’s immunity from constitutional attack is striking because of its  es-
pecial open-ended terms.114 The Act provides a broad authority to the Presi-
dent to implement sanctions without going to Congress.115 Challenges to 
IEEPA on First Amendment and other constitutional grounds has not been 
successful, although courts agreed that the Act provides “sweeping and un-
qualified” grants of power to the President.116 The courts have denied claims 
that IEEPA provides an unconstitutional grant of “essentially unbridled dis-
cretion to the Executive Branch”63 or that it is “unconstitutionally vague.”117 
The same judicial argument applies to the other laws authoring sanctions that 
are challenged on different constitutional grounds.118 Since the probability 
of success of any such claims is low, the risks of non-compliance with sanc-
tions are surprising high. The scope and applicability of the rules can be dif-
ficult to assess, and recent cases demonstrate the magnitude of the U.S. gov-
ernment’s reaction to violations.119  
As mentioned above, economic sanctions can be aimed against nation-
states or specific individuals and entities, and may include measures such as 
asset freezes, import tariffs, trade barriers, travel bans, and embargoes.120 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Casey et al., supra note 102, at 33.  
 113. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984). 
 114. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 US 654, 671 (1981).  
 117. U.S. v. Vaghari, No. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at 1 (E.D. Pa 2009). 
 118. Statutory Bases, supra note 78.  
 119.  Id. 
 120. Lin, supra note 36, at 1401; see also Jimmy Gurule, The Demise of the U.N. Eco-
nomic Sanctions Regime to Deprive Terrorists of Funding, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 19, 
20-22, 28 (2009) (demonstrating the prevalence of economic sanctions post September 11, 
2001). 
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OFAC has overseen many longstanding and recent financial sanctions as 
weapons in modern warfare against American enemies as diverse as the Ira-
nian Revolutionary Guard, terrorist organizations, Mexican drug cartels, and 
foreign nation-states.121 For instance, the U.S. and its allies imposed a series 
of economic sanctions against Russia and certain Russian citizens following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.122  
 
V. Effectiveness of U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions 
 
Despite the movement toward globalization, modern financial infra-
structure is very American-Centric such that economic sanctions imposed by 
the U.S. have a universal effect.123 Although geography may matter less in 
finance today, U.S. currency is the world’s reserve currency and the most 
trusted investment during times of distress.124 In 2015, 81% of global trade 
financing is funded by the U.S. dollar.125 Because of its significance, U.S. 
public and private institutions such as the Federal Reserve, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), stock exchanges, and major investment banks 
are at the forefront of international financial policies and practices. As such, 
when America takes financial measures against a country, it has global con-
sequences.126 For example, the financial rules and regulations declared by 
the U.S. after the September 11 attacks had a universal effect because of the 
importance of U.S. currency to global financial system.127 
Hence, because of the interconnectedness of modern finance and the 
central position of the U.S., banking prohibitions may make a restricted na-
tion-state or entity disconnected from the global financial system. They 
would not be able to obtain financing due to the risks that legal institutions 
might face by associating with these organizations.128 In a financial system 
that revolves around the U.S., American financial policy can leverage the 
 
 121. Lin, supa note 36, at 1402.  
 122. Id. at 1402.   
 123. See Richard Barrett, Time to Reexamine Regulation Designed to Counter the Financ-
ing of Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 7, 10 (2009) (discussing American-centric fi-
nancial infrastructure). 
 124. Lin, supra note 36, at 1386-87.  
 125. Id. at 1387 (citing a report by Ian Bremmer & Cliff Kupcha, EURASIA GROUP, Top 
Risks 9 (2015)). A copy of the report is available at: https://eurasiagroup.bluema-
trix.com/sellside/AttachmentViewer.action?encrypt=bb489f5d-29ae-439a-9355-
6f824999bf34&fileId=16645_fcb7dbe1-770f-4ad0-81de-
829815eae238&isPdf=false?link=instory (last visited Apr. 4, 2021). 
 126. Id. at 1387.  
 127. Barrett, supra note 123, at 10. 
 128. Zarate, supra note 14, at 2-5.  
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support of international financial institutions129 to push adversaries out of the 
international financial community.130 
While there is no definitive proof that nation-wide economic sanctions 
are successful,131 the countries have long used such policies and they have 
become more widespread in recent years.132 Economic sanctions are in-
tended to inflict financial harm and destruction to the enemy in a hot war or 
a cold war.133 Although the economic theory of sanctions is largely based on 
assumptions as to how trade can be affected by sanctions, such  an assump-
tion cannot take into account t all of the facts, such as human behavior and 
the responses of the country leaders who are under the sanctions regime.134 
Scholars have argued that economic sanctions have only a limited capacity 
to achieve their intended objectives.135 “The effectiveness of sanctions is fur-
ther reduced today due to a growing interdependency between markets and 
a shrinking world.”136 
If the use of economic sanctions is strategically effective, it could be 
tempting for countries to misuse the policy.137 One reason why some coun-
tries have changed their conduct is because they need to defend themselves 
from the overuse of economic sanctions imposed by other countries.138 
Moreover, a reasonable leader is likely to restrict his or her activities in order 
to limit the choices of political opposition within a country that he or she 
considers to be a threat to their political power. However, there are some 
leaders whose behavior appears to be unaffected by the use of economic 
sanctions.139 
Although no weapon can completely avoid every attack by an enemy, 
thoughtfully targeted financial restrictions can provide the most protection 
from adversaries.140 On the other hand, economic sanctions tend to be the 
best choice for countries that are reluctant to fight and endanger the lives of 
 
 129. Id. at 349. 
 130. Id. at 24. 
 131. Smeets, supra note 2, at 3. 
 132. Lin, supra note 36, at 1401. 
 133. Lin, supra note 36, at 1401. 
 134, Smeets, supra note 2, at 4. 
 135. See, e.g., Lobsinger, supra note 21, at 121; Amichai Cohen, Economic Sanctions in 
IHL: Suggested Principles, 42 ISR. L. REV. 117, 135 (2009); Egle, supra note 28, at 47.  
 136. Smeets, supra note 2, at 5.  
 137. Amichai Cohen, Economic Sanctions in IHL: Suggested Principles, 42 
ISR. L. REV. 117, 135 (2009). 
 138. Id.; see generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER (5th 2009). 
 139. Cohen, supra note 137, at 144 (“In dictatorships, for instance, ruling party officials 
continue to receive perks and the armed forces continue to receive supplies of food and other 
goods despite sanctions imposed on the State.”).  
 140. Lin, supra note 36, at 1405.   
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their soldiers.141 Economic sanctions are therefore seen by policymakers as 
a good replacement for the more dangerous policy of using military forces; 
a resolution that entails no risks and only benefits.142 However, economic 
sanctions do not always produce the desired goal of the imposing country, 
often because the sanctions are used when they are not needed and inflict 
needless suffering on civilians.143  
Scholars use the example of economic sanctions against Cuba to argue 
that economic sanctions are not successful and place unreasonable economic 
pressure on Cuba’s internal political issues.144 Many of critics argue that such 
unilateral economic sanctions without the authorization of the Security 
Council should be considered as a violation of non-intervention rule from an 
international law point of view.145 The U.S. has been attempting to place a 
full embargo on Cuba for more than half a century.146 Most of the sanctions 
have not accomplished their objectives and  most of them are now coming 
to an end.147 On December 17, 2014, President Obama proposed a new path 
in the 50-year U.S. sanctions strategy against Cuba.148 The announced 
changes were intended to normalize diplomatic relations between Cuba and 
the U.S., to allow travel, some trade relations, and the flow of information to 
and from Cuba.149 OFAC and BIS implemented new rules amending the Cu-
ban Assets Control Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations 
in accordance with new policies announced by the President.150 In other 
words, the President’s announcement that “50 years have shown that isola-
tion has not worked,” and the subsequent steps of the Administration to de-
crease the use of sanctions against Cuba show how the sanctions policy 
against Cuba failed.151 U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea are also 
 
 141. Cohen, supra note 137, at 123. 
 142. Id. at 135. 
 143. Id. at 136. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See e.g., Doraev, George N. Barrie, International Law and Economic Coercion - A 
Legal Assessment, 11 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 40, 53 (1985-1986); Derek W. Bowett, Interna-
tional Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 245, 246-254 (1976).  
 146. Smeets, supra note 2, at 4. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Press Release, THE WHITE HOUSE, Statement by President Barack Obama, Statement 
by the President on Cuba Policy Changes (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.; see also Press Release, DEP’T OF TREASURY, Fact Sheet: Treasury and Commerce 
Announce Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.treas-
ury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9740.aspx. 
 151. Doraev, supra note 1, at 386 (internal quotation omitted).  
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far-reaching and continue to be expanded.152 Some have argued that eco-
nomic sanctions are not effective as North Korea continues to have business 
interactions with certain trading partners to bypass U.S. economic sanc-
tions.153 
Although imposing sanctions is based on the theory that they decrease 
the income and the welfare of the target country because the target country 
suffers depreciation in its economy and eventually complies, given the rising 
interdependence of global markets, there are alternate ways for the target 
country to enter markets.154 Sanctions are often  frequently circumvented by 
trading with third parties who refuse to comply with the sanctions.155 Today, 
the world is more interdependent, thus increasingly complicating trading re-
lations between all countries. These new realities are the result of the rapid 
growth of international commerce, globalization, liberalization, and the rise 
of multinational companies with complex interrelations in trade and invest-
ment with foreign subsidiaries.156 One cannot conclude that by depressing 
the economy of a target country, its leaders will have no choice but to comply 
with the objectives of the imposing country. Pressure from economic sanc-
tions may have the reverse effect. Leaders may use the sanctions to justify 
the lower levels of economic growth and welfare to prevent even more sanc-
tions.157 The economic sanctions against Iraq are a good example. Saddam 
Hussain’s resistance to outside pressure caused by the sanctions ultimately 
led to the military intervention.158 Furthermore, research studies have shown 
that economic sanctions lose much of the impact after their first and second 
years, followed by a sharp decline over time.159 
 In another report, researchers found that “[the effects [or economic 
sanctions] are only significant in the first two years and turn negative after 
six to seven years, reflecting that even short-term sanction costs will wane 
 
 152. See generally Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
North Korea Sanctions, available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanc-
tions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/north-korea-sanctions.  
 153. See e.g., Kaitlan Collins et. al., Trump Announces New North Korea Sanctions, CNN, 
(Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/23/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-sanc-
tions/index.html; Katrina Manson, US Sanctions 27 Shipping Companies over North Korea 
Ties, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/666e7710-18ab-11e8-
9376-4a6390addb44. 
 154. Smeets, supra note 2, at 6. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Peter Muchlinski, The Changing Face of Transnational Business Governance: Pri-
vate Corporate Law Liability and Accountability of Transnational Groups in A Post-Finan-
cial Crisis World, 18 IND. J GLOB. LEG. STUD. 665, 666 (2011).  
 157. Smeets, supra note 2, at 5. 
 158. Id. at 6. 
 159. See Hufbauer et al., supra note 69. 
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due to economic adjustment.”160 In this manner, the target country is more 
likely to become immune to economic spirals caused by sanctions rather than 
more vulnerable over time. During the sanctions period, the target country 
can strengthen its diplomatic ties in order to build alliances with other coun-
tries, expand its import industry, and establish new trade relationships.161 
Hence, the speedy application of sanctions to prevent the target country from 
coordinating a resistance to the sanctions is essential to the effectiveness of 
sanctions.162 The role of third countries and their participation in the sanction 
period is vital for fostering  ties with the target country.163 For example, Rus-
sia and China developed approximately forty finance and technology agree-
ments in October 2014, and China is turning to Brazil and Latin American 
countries to compensate its losses due to restrictions on importing agricul-
tural goods from other countries. 164 
Another example of sanctions diminishing effectiveness in the long-
term are the U.S. sanctions against Russia. U.S. economic sanctions against 
Russia are a combination of economic and political sanctions.165 The U.S. 
imposed sanctions on Russia mainly in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion 
and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and parts of eastern Ukraine.166 
The sanctions include the freezing of assets of individuals and companies, 
restrictions on financial transactions with Russian businesses, restrictions on 
oil-related goods, and dual-use exports.167 The sanctions also targeted several 
Russian officials and politicians, banning them from entering the U.S. and 
freezing their assets and properties abroad.168 
Russia experienced a significant depreciation of its currency due to the 
sanctions, with a fall of almost 50% in its value in 2014.169 Sanctions exac-
erbated the investment climate in Russia and had a major effect on the Rus-
sian Central Bank’s ability to borrow money.170 Shortly after the implemen-
tation of sanctions against Russia, the international oil market crashed—
presumably strengthening the power of the sanctions and the chances of their 
 
160 Sajjad Faraji Dizaji & Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, P., Potential Early Phase Success and 
Ultimate Failure of Economic Sanctions: A VAR Approach with an Application to Iran, 50(6) 
J. of Peace Res. 721, 734 (2013). 
 161. Smeets, supra note 2, at 8.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Smeets, supra note 2, at 10. 
 166. Corry Welt et al., CONG. RES. SERV., R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia 1 (2020), 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45415. 
 167. Smeets, supra note 2, at 10. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.   
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success.171 On the basis of several press reports, the Russian Central Bank 
had to dig deep into its reserve to support the Ruble, but it continued to de-
preciate.172 Hence, purchasing power diminished and many goods became 
unavailable.173 
Nevertheless, the structural dimension and trade patterns of Russia have 
remained largely unchanged since 1990s.174 Because the Russian economy 
is not significantly diversified, it is potentially less susceptible to the eco-
nomic impacts of sanctions.175 The economy is highly dependent on the im-
port of goods and supplies for the use, production, and export of raw mate-
rials and essential items. Russian exports are mainly made up of mineral 
imports, including chemicals, food, and agricultural machinery.176 
From a political viewpoint, Russian leadership has succeeded in man-
aging the difficult economic situation caused by the sanctions.177 The real 
purpose of sanctions was to damage the Russian economy and minimize po-
litical support for President Putin and force Russia to de-annex Crimea.178 
Despite a relatively low GDP growth rate, Russia’s current economy is 
stronger than it was in 2014, when sanctions were imposed.179 The sanctions 
did not have a major effect on Russian imports and Russia’s net exports and 
GDP continued to rise.180 Sanctions have also failed to minimize President 
Putin’s political popularity, as seen by the 2018 elections when President 
Putin raised his vote percentage from 65% to 76%.181  
Russia is also diversifying its trade by building closer relations with 
other countries in order to have access to technology and finances to trade in 
agricultural goods; and to export its oil.182 This means that Russia’s reliance 
on foreign goods and services for internal use and its supply of goods and 
services to foreign markets will change.183 Because some countries, includ-
ing South Korea, have not joined to enforce sanctions against Russia, the 
 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 11. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Sergei F. Sutyrin et al., Integrating into the Multilateral Trading System and 
Global Value Chains: The Case of Russia, IN CONNECTING TO GLOBAL MARKETS, Challenges 
and Opportunities: Case Studies Presented by WTO Chair-holders (Marion Jansen et al. eds, 
2014) at 106-107. 
 175. Smeets, supra note 2, at 11. 
 176. Id. at 11. 
 177. Id. at 12. 
 178. Id. 
 179. L. Jan Reid, The Effect of American and European Sanctions on Russia, 1, 4-6 COAST 
ECON. CONSULTING (2019).  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Smeets, supra note 2, at 12 
 183. Id. 
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effect of sanctions is diminished. Moreover, the inevitable market opportu-
nities presented by Russia make other countries hesitant to renew their sanc-
tions against Russia.184 
However, growing evidence proves that there is an inverse relationship 
between the length of sanctions and their efficiency. The effectiveness of the 
sanctions decreased the longer the sanctions were imposed, showing how 
sanctions that have been in play for years lose the power to coerce the target 
country into complying with the objectives of the imposing country.185 This 
debunks the presumption that sanctions against a country in the long term 
will work.186 Therefore, sanction imposing countries need to be more strate-
gic with respect to the length and extension of the sanctions.  
 
VI. Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the Fight Against Terrorism 
 
 Despite the increase use of economic sanctions efforts, terrorist or-
ganizations continue to use illicit and undercover means to gain access to 
funds in the global financial system.187 As a result, the U.S., as the lone fi-
nancial superpower in the world, has used multiple financial measures 
against its adversaries in an innovative and effective manner.188 In recent 
years, the internationalization of terrorism has become an undeniable char-
acteristic of the modern world.189 It can be said that non-state actors, includ-
ing terrorist organizations, will continue to play a more prominent role in 
global affairs.190 In this regard, the conventional method of viewing terrorism 
in terms of nation-states is obsolete, and even dangerous.  
Traditional norms of war and armed conflict are comprehensive and  
rich in addressing the actions of state adversaries but are not as well suited 
to address the actions of non-state adversaries.191 While non-state adver-
saries, such as terrorist organizations, have existed for decades, most of the 
legal infrastructure remains best adapted to confronting state rather than non-
state adversaries. Traditional doctrines of war do not meet the new realities 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 13. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Lin, supra note 36, at 1400, see also J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Asso-
ciations, and the “Incorporation Transparency Act”, 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 857-62 (2010). 
 188. See Zarate, supra note 14, at ix (noting that “[o]ver the past decade, the United States 
has waged a new brand of financial warfare, unprecedented in its reach and effectiveness.”).  
 189. Lobsinger, supra note 21, at 116.  
 190.  NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National 
Intelligence Council's 2020 Project 111 (Dec. 2004), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?ab-
stract&did=484392. 
 191. Lin, supra note 32, at 1422, see also Kenneth Anderson, U.S. Counterterrorism Pol-
icy and Superpower Compliance with International Human Rights Norms, 30 Fordham Int’l 
L.J. 455, 472 (2007). 
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of non-state adversaries who play a more significant role in contemporary 
warfare.192  For this reason, the  lack of “comity, reciprocity, and accounta-
bility” amongst non-state adversaries raises new legal challenges.193 Never-
theless, many non-state adversaries reside in places governed by state adver-
saries or neutral states making it far more difficult to identify who the non-
state actor is.194 Certain actions by non-state adversaries, such as those using 
cyber financial weapons, recognition is challenging or almost impossible, 
often making enforcement action unachievable at a reasonable and satisfac-
tory level.195 
There are a variety of debates about terrorism and its origins. In one 
sense, terrorism is an act of political expression that generates public atten-
tion to a specific group or cause.196 In another sense, it is a manifestation of 
desperation and hopelessness for a better way of life.197 Many, however, ad-
dress the origins of modern terrorism in poverty, religion, and envy.198 If a 
society is isolated and unable to modernize, expand, and enter the world 
economy, people will have little opportunity to earn a living, and this in turn 
will produce waves of resentment against those who profit from the other-
wise growing global market.199  
Terrorist groups have a common tradition of recruiting members from 
the poor who have few opportunities to support themselves.200 Terrorist 
groups recognize that a lack of economic opportunities combined with a lack 
peaceful alternatives to alleviating hardship allows terrorist ideologies to 
take root.201 “To pretend that the issue of terrorism is simply a choice 
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between good and evil is to know nothing of human psychology.”202 Public 
despair and political and social humiliation provide fertile ground for terror-
ist to exploit and more easily manipulate the minds of desperate individuals, 
not always in the name of religion but sometimes in the name of revenge or 
as an act of political empowerment. 203 One of the mentioned objectives of 
Al Qaeda is revenge for the alleged historical mistreatment of Muslims 
around the world.204 For some of these individuals, terrorist actions are em-
powering because the act does not rely on their government taking action 
against perceived wrongs and the act gives voice to their frustration against 
an enemy state with superior strength. 205  
In his final speech in the U.K., President Bill Clinton acknowledged 
“how abject poverty accelerates conflict, how it creates recruits for terrorists 
and those who incite ethnic and religious hatred, [and] how it fuels a violent 
rejection of the economic and social order on which our future depends.”206 
The Bush Administration expressed a similar sentiment when it indicated 
that it “is aware of the link between desperate economic circumstances and 
terrorism.”207 The Middle East is the main target for terrorist recruiters due 
to its exceptionally high unemployment rate, the absence of GDP growth, 
and lack of free markets and stable financial institutions.208 However, inter-
national and state counter-terrorism initiatives have generally ignored the 
root causes of terrorism. Although the 1999 U.S. government profile on ter-
rorism acknowledged this point, its post September 11 agendas have largely 
overlooked it.209 As such, most terrorism prevention effort focused on stop-
ping terrorism via nation-wide economic sanctions is not effective. 
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Economic sanctions do have a significant impact on the economy of a 
developing nation.210 But the negative effects of an increased unemployment 
rate, reduced opportunities to export goods, and the inability to receive sub-
stantial international aid are felt more severely by the population than by the 
intended governmental targets.211 Even when the population is struggling to 
establish an adequate living environment under a powerless government, 
these governments find ways to finance or support extremist groups.212 
Moreover, when people encounter poverty and lack of resources due to eco-
nomic sanctions, this further encourages western hostility.213 The sanctions 
may establish a setting for dissatisfaction and hostility which foster ideolog-
ical extremism and terrorism.214  
Effective antiterrorism policies need to address the central issues that 
promote terrorism. As Representative J.C. Watts of Oklahoma explained: 
“[O]ur national security improves when global stability prevails.”215 As such, 
global stability may require sanction imposing countries to consider alterna-
tives to nation-wide sanctions. A nation without diplomatic relations is al-
most isolated, which precludes the improvement of social changes and re-
sults in defensive governmental actions. 216 Therefore diplomatic relations 
and negations between sanction imposing governments and sanctioned coun-
tries prevents isolation and enhances social development, thus facilitating 
human rights and economic integration.217  
As terrorism becomes more internationalized, non-state terrorism has 
adapted to exists on the fringe of economic activity or completely outside 
the ordinary economy.218 Consequently, the economy of non-state terrorist 
organization is less impacted by nation-wide sanctions, in contrast to state-
sponsored terrorism.219 Increasing evidence shows the degree to which 
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terrorist organizations, especially non-state organizations, receive funds 
through the illegal trade on drugs.220 The U.S. government has evidence that 
Hezbollah and terrorist groups in Yemen and Lebanon have earned direct 
profits from the selling of methamphetamine in Chicago, Detroit, and other 
U.S. cities.221 Among Islamic terrorist organizations, no organization has 
been more involved in illegal drug trade than the Taliban in Afghanistan.222 
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has proposed that Osama bin-
Laden may have directly supported the trade of heroin from Afghanistan to 
fund terrorist activities.223 
The modern financial infrastructure is the new sphere of war.224 This 
new sphere provides a special fighting space for  adversaries since they may 
be able to steal large amounts of money through cyberterrorist activities to 
fund other terrorist activities while also causing widespread financial crisis 
and damage.225 “Unlike previous wartime theaters, the financial theater of 
war is less defined by geography and more by its critical functions, assets, 
and liabilities” which “presents new risks, threats and vulnerabilities for 
modern warfare posed by a cast of familiar and unfamiliar antagonists.” 226 
The new mechanisms of terrorist financing freezing and confiscations 
of assets, has led to systematic cooperation between governments and inter-
national organizations to fight against terrorist financing.227 Although, the 
FATF has established sanctions as a critical step to prevent terrorist funding, 
it may not be enough to just freeze suspected assets, the FATF must rely on 
foreign governments to police bank records to prevent the financing of ter-
rorism.228 Furthermore, as a result of terrorists’  access to technology, the 
current terrorist threat is worrying because of the significant impact it could 
have on financial markets and a country’s development.229 Terrorist organi-
zations have also founded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to re-
cruit members and spread information of terrorist targets; to receive official 
recognition from governments and international organizations, such as the 
U.N.; for their humanitarian activities; and to collect donations.230 One of the 
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nine modern terrorism-related dangers identified by the  FATF is the creation 
of terrorist front organizations as legitimate NGOs.231 
Despite the apparent weakness and ineffectiveness of economic sanc-
tions, they remain an excellent alternative to military force. When properly 
collaborated, nation-wide sanctions can be an effective deterrent policy, as 
seen when sanction dissuaded both South Korea and Taiwan from their pur-
suit of nuclear weaponry in the 1970s and reversed a coup in Paraguay in 
1996. 232 
Although sanctions may be an effective policy choice, sometimes they 
are not given enough time to be successful. 233 Moreover, as shown by sanc-
tions against Russia and Cuba, even when sanctions are given time, they are 
not always effective in achieving the desired policy goals. Despite the poor 
track record of sanctions, they remain popular because they are a “powerful 
expression of disagreement” with the target country’s policies and allow 
government leaders to show the electorate that they are taking action rather 
than doing nothing.234 
There is an ideological rift between those who see unilateral economic 
sanctions as efficient and helpful in achieving foreign policy goals and those 
who find sanctions to be ineffective or counterproductive.235 According to 
an analysis of the 54 U.S. unilateral economic sanction cases between 1970 
and 2014, success was only achieved in eleven cases.236 
Overall, only a third of economic sanctions are estimated to be success-
ful, with success defined as making a significant contribution to substantial 
achievement of foreign policy outcomes sought by the sanction imposing 
country. 237 
 
VII. Alternative Solutions 
 
Most economic sanctions have been too broad to successfully achieve 
their desired objectives.238 Therefore, activity-based sanctions, also known 
as “smart” or “targeted” sanctions,  are the next rational step in motivating 
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target countries to comply.239 One comprehensive study found that sanctions 
with narrow policy objectives, such as the release of hostage, were only ef-
fective half of the time, while sanctions directed to regime changes were only 
successful 30% of the time between 1970 and 2014.240 Instead of imposing 
broad nation-wide sanctions, U.N. smart sanctions have started to tack on 
criminal culpability to individual leaders.241 These sanctions allow the U.N. 
to divert any unintended adverse effects away from the general public to spe-
cifically targeted individuals within the regime, with the intent to financially 
crippling the regime itself. 242 The EU has also started to impose smart sanc-
tions as a weapon against terrorism maintaining a “terrorist list” and strictly 
targeting individuals rather than enlisting unnecessarily broad sanctions that 
target the whole country.243 
In the 1990s. the U.S. adopted the policy of imposing smart sanctions, 
which were later imposed against Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.244 The recent 
developments of U.S. sanctions policies expand the role of smart sanctions 
which target foreign officials or governmental functions without substan-
tially impacting on overall economy and the people of the target state.245  
Smart sanctions can theoretically be for effective, if they are combined 
with “deepened international cooperation and flexible approaches towards 
the revocability of coercive measures . . . . ” 246 The U.S. government can 
trace the financial “footprint” of terrorist networks, weapons proliferators, 
and drug traffickers by blacklisting them from accessing their funds.247 For 
this reason, smart sanctions offer a better alternative to nation-wide sanc-
tions.  
Unlike state-sponsored terrorism whose funding is vastly dependent on 
the state of the country’s economy,248 non-state terrorism usually operates on 
the margins of the economic activity and even entirely outside the country’s 
economy.249 Hence, the funding of non-state terrorism is less affected by na-
tion-wide sanctions. Nation-wide sanctions can disrupt the economic devel-
opment of the target country and thereby eliminating a number of economic 
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opportunities its people.250 This in turn can foster a setting for dissatisfaction 
and hostility towards the sanction imposing country and encourage ideolog-
ical extremism and terrorism.251 
The most appropriate time for the World Bank and similar institutions 
to start their development programs is when terror recruiters are searching in 
neighborhoods for new recruits.252 Although these organizations have been 
addressing poverty from since their inception, preventing terrorism has not 
been a central focus of their programs.253  
Nevertheless, eliminating poverty remains an important and vital solu-
tion to prevent terrorism. Antipoverty programs improve health, promote the 
sanctity of life, increase access to education, and eventually promotes de-
mocracy and new economic development opportunities.254 Although signif-
icant economic growth and political stability will not completely eliminate 
the risk of terrorism, the goal of any effective antiterrorism policy should 





Today we are witnessing a pattern of global regionalism and the inter-
nationalization of terrorism. Terrorism has typically been carried out by in-
dependent organizations such as overly radical religious and nationalist 
groups. For example, sixty-eight groups may be included in the U.S State 
Department’s List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, yet no sin-
gle organization is explicitly or officially funded by a single nation-state.256 
Terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and ISIS do not hold quantifiable ter-
ritories and their leaders are highly mobile and operate under the radar.257 
These organizations can be far more dangerous than state-sponsored terror-
ism because they operate in a wide variety of territories. For example, the 
Taliban both spread their radical ideologies to people and recruited “ji-
hadists” to from all over the world.258   
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As terrorism loses its national identity, the use of nation-wide sanctions 
established two decades ago is no longer a successful strategy to fight terror-
ism. For this reason, nation-wide sanctions should not be used as permanent 
counter-terrorism policy.  
New anti-terrorism policies must implement a combination of smart 
sanctions and antipoverty programs to combat the disparate conditions that 
allow non-state terrorism to grow. Politicians often ignore the fact that coun-
try-specific sanctions are a double-edged sword because instead of promot-
ing political collaboration, they foster animosity and impose economic hard-
ships on countries that further exasperate radical ideologies the foster 
terrorism. When sanctions are not limited to specific activities, they can be 
less effective against modern forms of terrorism. Although economic sanc-
tions have a long way to go before becoming a particularity effective foreign 
policy tool, the implementation of smart sanctions do appear to have more 
successful outcomes.259 For this reason, economic sanctions can be a suc-
cessful counter-terrorism policy if they are activity-based rather than nation-
wide sanctions and are combined with antipoverty initiatives.  
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